BlogDetecting IMSI/IMEI Change Across 2G/3G/4G/5G
Bố cục bài viết
Trang này
Ngày tạo
28/07/2026
Cập nhật
Lượt xem
7
Đọc
5m
Detecting IMSI/IMEI Change Across 2G/3G/4G/5G
Consolidated signaling reference for correlation/monitoring pipelines
There is no single “IMSI/IMEI changed” alarm native to any generation of 3GPP core network — detection is achieved by correlating the (IMSI, IMEI/PEI) pairing across signaling touchpoints over time and flagging anomalous churn. This document lists every relevant signal per generation, what it carries, and how it fits into a correlation pipeline.
1. 2G/3G (GSM/UMTS — MAP/SS7, GTPv1-C)
| Point | Message / Service | What you get | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Um/Uu (UE↔BSS/RNC), NAS (MM/GMM) | Identity Request/Response (Identity Type = IMEISV) | IMEI(SV) directly from UE | Direct source, cleartext over NAS |
| NAS | GPRS Attach Request / Routing Area Update Request | P-TMSI, optionally IMEISV | |
| SS7 MAP (VLR/SGSN↔HLR) | Update Location (MAP) | IMSI-level location/subscription sync | Equivalent of 4G’s ULR |
| SS7 MAP (VLR/SGSN↔HLR) | Insert Subscriber Data (MAP) | Subscriber profile push | HLR itself does not store IMEI |
| SS7 MAP (MSC/SGSN↔EIR) | MAP_CHECK_IMEI (checkIMEI operation) | Blacklist/greylist/whitelist verdict, carries IMEI in request | Canonical per-attach IMEI check point — equivalent of 4G’s S13 |
| SS7 MAP (gsmSCF↔HLR/VLR/SGSN) | MAP_OBTAIN_IMEI | On-demand IMEI retrieval for a given subscriber | The actual “fetch current IMEI” service |
| SS7 MAP (VLR/SGSN→gsmSCF, Gc interface) | NoteMM-Event (noteMM-Event operation) | Notification that a subscribed Mobility Management event occurred (e.g. IMSI Attach, MS available after IMSI Detach) for a subscriber provisioned with M-CSI/MG-CSI | Does not carry IMEI — it’s a CAMEL event-notification trigger, not an identity source. Useful only as a timestamp marker for MM events, not for IMEI correlation. |
| SS7 MAP (old SGSN↔new SGSN) | Send Identification | IMSI + security context transfer during inter-SGSN RAU | |
| GTPv1-C (Gn/Gp, SGSN↔SGSN) | SGSN Context Request/Response | IMSI + MM Context during handover | |
| CDR/billing | S-CDR / M-CDR / G-CDR | IMEISV embedded | Primary offline correlation source |
2. 4G (EPS — Diameter S6a/S6d/S13, GTPv2-C, NAS/S1AP)
| Point | Message | What you get | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| NAS (UE↔MME) | Attach Request / TAU Request | Optional IMEISV field | |
| S1AP (eNB↔MME) | Initial UE Message / UE Capability Info | May carry IMEISV via NAS container | |
| S13 (MME↔EIR) | ME-Identity-Check-Request/Answer (ECR/ECA) | IMEI(SV) sent for blacklist/greylist/whitelist check | Direct equivalent of MAP_CHECK_IMEI |
| S6a (MME↔HSS) | ULR — Terminal-Information AVP (IMEI + Software-Version) | IMEI on every location update | See earlier ULR breakdown |
| S6a (MME↔HSS) | Notify-Request (NOR) | New Terminal-Information when IMEI(SV) changes without a full location update | The dedicated “IMEI changed mid-session” signal — §5.2.5.1.1 of TS 29.272 |
| S6a/S6t (SCEF↔HSS) | Monitoring-Event-Configuration — IMSI-IMEI(SV) association monitoring type | Async notification when the IMSI-IMEI pairing changes | IoT/SCEF-oriented, requires subscription |
| CDR/billing | S-CDR / M-CDR | IMEISV embedded | Offline correlation source |
3. 5G (5GC/SA — SBI/HTTP2, NAS/N1)
| Point | Message/Service | What you get | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| N1 (UE↔AMF), NAS | Registration Request | 5G-GUTI or SUCI (encrypted SUPI); PEI only if requested | SUPI is not sent in clear |
| N1, NAS | Identity Request/Response (Identity Type = PEI) | IMEI(SV) as PEI, equivalent of the 2G/3G/4G Identity Request | |
| N8 (AMF↔UDM), SBI/HTTP2 | Nudm_UECM_Registration | AMF registers UE with UDM, includes PEI | 5G equivalent of ULR |
| N8 (AMF↔UDM), SBI/HTTP2 | Nudm_UECM_Update | Updates PEI/serving-node info without full re-registration | 5G equivalent of S6a Notify-Request |
| N8, SBI/HTTP2 | Nudm_SDM_Get / Nudm_SDM_Subscribe | Subscription data pull | Equivalent of ULA’s Subscription-Data |
| N17 (AMF↔5G-EIR), SBI/HTTP2 | N5g-eir_EquipmentIdentityCheck_Get | PEI blacklist/greylist/whitelist verdict | Direct SBI equivalent of S13 ME-Identity-Check |
| N12 (AMF↔AUSF) | Nausf_UEAuthentication | Ties SUPI (deconcealed from SUCI) to the auth event | Needed before you can key your IMSI table at all |
| N40/CHF | 5G Charging Data Records | PEI embedded | Offline correlation source, same role as CDRs in earlier gens |
Key structural difference vs. 2G/3G/4G: SUPI (IMSI) is not sent in cleartext over N1/radio — the UE sends SUCI (encrypted). SUPI is only recoverable after AUSF/UDM deconcealment. This means your IMSI-IMEI correlation table for 5G must be anchored on N8 (Nudm_UECM_Registration) events, not radio-side capture — unlike earlier generations where both identifiers could appear in cleartext NAS before core-side security context was established.
4. Correlation strategy (generation-agnostic)
- Build a rolling table keyed both ways:
last-known-IMEI-per-IMSIandlast-known-IMSI-per-IMEI, refreshed from the strongest available signal per generation (S13/N17/MAP_CHECK_IMEI for verified IMEI, S6a ULR+NOR / N8 UECM for HSS/UDM-visible IMEI). - Flag anomalies, not just changes:
- Rapid IMEI churn on one IMSI (multiple IMEIs within minutes/hours) → possible cloning.
- Same IMEI reused across multiple concurrent IMSIs → classic SIM-box / IMEI-cloning signature.
- A blacklisted IMEI (from EIR/5G-EIR/CEIR) reappearing under a new IMSI → stolen-device reuse.
- Prefer EIR/5G-EIR-sourced IMEI over self-reported NAS IMEI where possible — NAS-layer IMEISV is UE-asserted and unauthenticated; EIR-layer values are the ones actually checked against blacklists.
- 5G-specific caveat: correlation cannot begin until SUPI deconcealment (post-AUSF), so a purely radio-side capture pipeline (as used for 2G/3G/4G cleartext IMSI) will not work for 5G SA — you need visibility at N8/N12, not N1.
Compiled from 3GPP TS 29.002 (MAP), TS 29.272 (S6a/S6d), TS 29.336 (SCEF), TS 29.503/29.510 (SBI/UDM/5G-EIR), TS 23.502 (5GS procedures).